The losers? The resistance axis: Assad, Tehran and Hezbollah.
The surprise offensive by Syrian rebels led by a radical Islamist group with roots in Al Qaeda dramatizes the enormous regional repercussions set off by Israel’s war against Lebanon’s Hezbollah.
Badly battered by Israel’s air strikes and ground campaign in southern Lebanon, Hezbollah’s inability, at least for now, to be a prominent player in defense of the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is a real game-changer, as evidenced by the ease and speed with which the insurgents advanced on the ground after launching their campaign on Nov 27.
Having taken Aleppo the HTS-led forces have also gained complete control of Idlib province and entered Hama province where they are engaged in heavy clashes with the Syrian army backed up by Russian warplanes.
Their success to date poses a serious dilemma for the United States given that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS, is leading the charge, although a number of Turkish-backed groups, including the “Syrian National Army,” are also involved. HTS is identified as a Salafi-Jihadist group and was formerly known as the Al Qaeda-affiliated Nusra Front and is designated by the U.S. and other countries as a terrorist group.
Of course, it was Al Qaeda which carried out the worst-ever attack on the U.S. homeland on September 11, 2001. While the leadership of HTS publicly split from Al-Qaeda and appears focused on the local situation in Syria, it remains committed to the Salafi-Jihadi ideology of its former parent organization.
The rebel offensive was launched the same day the ceasefire between Lebanon and Israel took effect. The timing was no doubt linked to the weakened state of Hezbollah, which played a critical role in helping the Syrian government gain the upper hand against armed insurgents following the eruption of the civil war in Syria in 2011. Under the ceasefire deal with Israel, Hezbollah is obliged to end its armed presence in southern Lebanon, which could hence hinder the group’s ability to operate as an effective fighting force in Syria.
“They [the armed anti-Syrian government factions] wanted to take advantage of this ceasefire agreement that restricts the movement of Hezbollah,” explained Riad Kahwaji, founder of the Dubai-based Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis in an interview with RS.
Meanwhile, there exists a broad consensus that the war between Hezbollah and Israel contributed to the successful staging of the rebels’ shock offensive. To confront the Israeli military, Hezbollah withdrew forces from the Syrian arena, thereby creating a gap in the pro-government forces which naturally gave the insurgents a major opportunity. Indeed, the insurgents themselves noted the strategic advantage they accrued by Israel’s operations against Hezbollah.
Aside from the ceasefire conditions, there are other factors which render it unlikely that Hezbollah will deploy in large numbers to Syria, at least for the foreseeable future. Chief among these is war fatigue, after having fought a grueling conflict with Israel in which the movement incurred unprecedented heavy losses.
“Hezbollah is no longer able to be heavily involved militarily in the events in Syria and has been exhausted by the war with Israel,” according to retired Lebanese Army Gen. Hassan Jouni in remarks to RS.
Moreover, the group’s immediate focus will be on the southern front with Israel where the ceasefire appears to be barely holding. “The priority now will be on the front with Israel,” a source close to Hezbollah told RS, adding that it was therefore more likely that other players will step up to support Assad.
Meanwhile, Iran has made it clear that it remains firmly committed to preventing the insurgents from prevailing against the Syrian government. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi met Sunday with Assad in Damascus to discuss the latest developments, underscoring Tehran’s support for its traditional ally. Tehran has also pledged to keep military advisors in Syria, and fighters from Iran-allied Iraqi groups have crossed the border to help stall the advance of the insurgents.
These developments should hardly come as a surprise given that regional developments make it even more vital for Tehran to demonstrate its support of its Syrian ally.
“There is this belief that given the events in Gaza and Lebanon, the axis of resistance could be undermined in Syria, but Iran wants to show that this is not the case and will not happen,” said Abbas Aslan, senior fellow at the Tehran-based Center for Middle East Strategic Studies in a phone interview with RS.
What remains to be seen is how successful Tehran will be in propping up the Syrian government without relying so much as in the past on Hezbollah’s battle-hardened forces, notwithstanding Russian air operations against the insurgents.
That Tehran’s Iraqi allies will be able to fill the vacuum left by Hezbollah in Syria is questionable. The Lebanese Shiite movement’s battlefield prowess far exceeds that of the Iraqi armed Shiite factions. Moreover, experts believe that U.S. influence and pressure in Iraq limit how much manpower that the pro-Iranian Iraqi groups belonging to the “Popular Mobilization Forces” – otherwise known as the Hashd Al Shaabi– can deploy to Syria.
“We saw that the Iraqi Hashd forces were only able to send very limited reinforcements (to Syria), about two-to-three hundred” explained Kahwaji, adding that the United States was pressuring Baghdad not to provide Assad with support.
Washington’s stance regarding the unfolding developments reflects a state of confusion that has characterized U.S. policy since the conflict in Syria started over a decade ago.In an interview with CNN, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan voiced concerns over HTS while also hinting that Washington does not necessarily see the events in Syria in a negative light.
“We don’t cry over the fact that the Assad government, backed by Russia, Iran and Hezbollah, are facing certain kinds of pressure,” he remarked.
How the incoming Trump administration intends to deal with the situation in Syria is anyone’s guess. Given that the president-elect has chosen staunch Israeli supporters to occupy senior posts in his cabinet, there appears to be strong reason to believe that Trump 2.0 policy towards Damascus will be determined to a large degree by Israeli preferences. If so, Washington’s approach may be to weaken and possibly oust Assad from power given the latter’s longstanding alliance with Iran, which remains Public Enemy Number One for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
“I think Israel sees Turkey’s role as kingpin in Syria as a good thing as it cuts the Shiite crescent in half,” said Joshua Landis, the director of Middle East Studies at the University of Oklahoma and a non-resident fellow at the Quincy Institute. “Given that Trump’s team is staunchly pro-Israel, Trump may therefore tolerate an Islamist takeover of Syria,” he added.
Previous statements by the president-elect, however, suggest that he may opt to take a different path. Speaking on the campaign trail in 2016, Trump appeared to lend his support to Syria, Russia and Iran against ISIS, which shares with HTS the Salafi-Jihadist doctrine.
“I don’t like Assad at all, but Assad is killing ISIS. Russia is killing ISIS and Iran is killing ISIS,” he remarked at the time. He also wanted to pull U.S. troops out of Syria, but to this day they are still there.While these statements were never translated into tangible policy there is an expectation that Trump himself, rather than his aides, will be running the foreign policy show in his second term. Eight years ago, he clearly saw Salafi-Jihadist forces as a greater threat to U.S. interests than Assad or Iran. Whether that remains the case has yet to be seen.
